AR: Revista de Derecho Informático ISSN 1681-5726
Edita: Alfa-Redi
No. 088 - Noviembre del 2005
The drugs don’t work: Access to medicines in the developing world
Abstract: Development, poverty and the means to assist countries to break away from the causes of poverty have become some of the most important subjects in the international trade arena. Of these causes, the technological gap between developed and developing nations presents a compelling call for some sort of action in order to alleviate the resource inequality.
There are many examples that could illustrate that developing countries are being affected in some ways by the technological gap. Of these examples, one of the most important is the apparent struggle between large multinational pharmaceutical companies and developing nations with regards to access to medicines.
Development,
poverty and the means to assist countries to break away from the causes of
poverty have become some of the most important subjects in the international
trade arena. Of these causes, the technological gap between developed and
developing nations presents a compelling call for some sort of action in order
to alleviate the resource inequality.
There are many
examples that could illustrate that developing countries are being affected in
some ways by the technological gap. Of these examples, one of the most important
is the apparent struggle between large multinational pharmaceutical companies
and developing nations with regards to access to medicines. This is because the
question of health is one of the most important and contentious and evident
indicators of poverty. This article does not pretend to be an exhaustive study
of the issue of access to medicines, but some of the broader questions will be
discussed in order to provide some evidence that strong international protection
of technology may be affecting developing countries.
Health
technology is the most critical technology sought by the developing world. When
one takes a look at some of the worrying health figures in poor countries, one
of the most striking facts is that many of the health problems faced by the
inhabitants of these is that they are preventable, and can be addressed with
some of the existing health technology enjoyed by the West. The problem then has
to be one of resources and distribution, as multinational corporations own a
large share of this technology. This article will deal mostly with the issue of
access to medicines, but this is by no means the only concern when talking about
the access of less developed countries to health technology.
Amongst the
many technological advances in health, pharmaceuticals are more likely to be
owned than any other. Pharmaceuticals are essential for modern medicine, from
antibiotics to vitamins, from vaccines to anti-retroviral treatments; one cannot
imagine a healthy nation without proper access to the many treatments provided
by pharmaceuticals. As Chetley points out, “Modern drugs, used well, can help
the less developed countries to speed improvements in health, but they cannot
replace a lack of the necessary infrastructure to sustain better health.”[1]
This means that pharmaceuticals are not the only issue at stake when dealing
with health, but it is one very important factor. In fact, every day 30,000
people die of preventable infectious diseases, bringing the total of those who
die for those reasons to eleven million people per year.[2]
Arguably, these are people who have a much greater chance of survival if they
had access to the existing medicines that could potentially cure those diseases.
Oxfam notes that:
In
sub-Saharan Africa today average life expectancy is 50 years--some 28
years less than the average for people in high-income countries. Treatable
infectious diseases in the region account for 60% of deaths, while cancer and
cardiovascular disease--the leading causes of illness-related death in the
U.S.--account for only 15%.[3]
One of the
reasons why these populations do not have access to the medicines that could
save lives is because the price of health is high, as many medicines are owned
by pharmaceutical corporations that either sell their products at high prices,
or request that the developing countries purchase licences to produce or import
those medicines. The result of this system is an obvious discrepancy between the
prices of the medicines and the possibility of those who need them to acquire
these required medicaments.
The
international manufacture of pharmaceuticals is largely in the hands of a number
of multinational corporations that control large parts of the health market. As
any other industry based in the capitalist system, the multinational
pharmaceutical companies operate on a system that attempts to maximise profits
and shareholder value. If that is the goal for these companies, they are
certainly doing a much better job than any other industry in achieving those
goals, as the profits and money involved in the pharmaceutical industry are
staggering. In the year 2000, the pharmaceutical industry made $20.3 billion USD
in profits globally, with a percentage of profits against sales of 18.6%, higher
than any other industry studied, including the automotive, entertainment and
telecommunications industries.[4]
Globally, there are ten pharmaceutical companies in the Global Fortune 500 list,
which have sales that total more than $131 billion USD between them.[5]
This data does not even consider global giant Bayer, as they are diversifying in
other fields and not only pharmaceuticals. In total, it is believed that the
pharmaceutical industry will have worldwide revenue of $406 billion USD in
2002.[6]
Of this total, North America accounts for 41.8% of the total pharmaceutical
market, with 24% from Europe and 11.3% from Japan alone. In
contrast, China and South
East Asia account for only 5% of the total market, the Indian sub-continent 1.8%
and Africa has only 1.3% of the market.[7]
This means that the pharmaceutical companies are staying away from some of the
largest sections of the world’s population.
The reason for
this disparity is that pharmaceutical development is concentrated in some very
few countries, mostly because to be successful in this industry there is a need
to have considerable amounts of expenditure in research and development of new
medicines. This is because the industry is highly competitive, and to remain
competitive heavy spending is required to obtain new curative chemical
compounds.[8]
Unfortunately, only few countries in the world have the resources to invest in
the required levels of research needed to compete in this market. The United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), commissioned a report that
classifies countries according to their pharmaceutical development capacity.[9]
Of these, only ten countries were considered to be able to produce a
sophisticated output, and provide enough research to stay ahead. It is needless
to say that these countries are considered developed. In contrast, only five
developing countries were found to be capable of producing pharmaceuticals
through imitation and reverse engineering – these countries are Argentina,
China, India, Korea and Mexico.[10]
Most other developing countries were able to produce limited versions or dosages
of existing pharmaceuticals, but were unable to produce any innovative
chemicals. Most worryingly, 59 LDCs did not have a pharmaceutical industry
whatsoever.
There are also
some problems about the allocation of research in countries that have the
capabilities to perform them. It is evident that under the present regime, there
is a danger that research and development of drugs for illnesses affecting the
developing world will continue to be under-funded, and that the money will be
spent in high-return lifestyle drugs that are more profitable and sold almost
exclusively in the developed countries, as is the case with drugs like Viagra,
Zyban, Propecia, and Xenocal – evidence by the fact that 76% of all drugs
approved in the US between 1989 and 2000 do not offer significant therapeutical
benefits.[11]
It has been pointed out that the problem with the way in which research is
directed, is that it explicitly responds to profits, and not to the lack of
research in that particular area. In fact:
Lack
of scientific knowledge is not the major barrier to drug development - more is
known about the biology, immunology, and genetics of leishmania and trypanosomes
than any other parasites. Nor does the gap lie with technology, which has
greatly benefited from recent advances. Policy issues seem to be the main
obstacle to the translation of this knowledge into actual benefit for
patients.[12]
The
concentration of profits and research spending in some few developed nations
have resulted in an industry that wields considerable economic power
concentrated in one the mightiest economic industries on the planet. The
industry’s economic power has been translated to political power, as the
industry has been generous in spending in lobbying and advertising. It is
believed that in the year 2000 and in the United States
alone, the members of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association
(PhRMA) – the main pharmaceutical industry group – spent a total of $360 million
US dollars in lobbying and policy advertising campaigns. The main lobbying
recipients were the United States Congress and other policy-making governmental
organisations.[13]
But perhaps more worrying is the fact that the pharmaceutical industries has
established very strong links with the Bush administration. Industry members
donated $6.3 million USD to the Republican Party during the last elections, with
the giant drugs company Glaxo-Wellcome donating $1.2 million USD, while drug
companies contributed $1.7 million USD to the inaugural party of the then newly
elected President G. W. Bush.[14]
As a result of this, even the most superficial analysis of the issue of drugs
and less developed countries cannot help but notice how the interests of the
United
States and those of the pharmaceutical
companies seem indistinguishable.
From all of
the intellectual property industries of the world, the pharmaceutical industry
is the one that benefits the most benefits from the existence of the patent
system, as they are awarded with a limited monopoly in the products discovered
during research in pharmaceuticals that allows them exclusive control of the
exploitation, manufacture, and licensing of the work. One of the justifications
for the existence of patents is to allow the inventor of a product to recuperate
the economic investment incurred in the creation of that product, and to profit
from its exclusive use. Because of this monopoly, the pharmaceutical companies
can charge whatever seems fit to recover said investment. Part of the profits
then goes towards future research and development of new drugs.
The reason for
this particular benefit is that it is undeniable that the pharmaceutical
industry is the field of innovation in which the justifications for intellectual
property are more evident than in any other. Several studies have demonstrated
time and time again that without patents the amount of innovations in
pharmaceuticals would be greatly reduced. For example, a study of British
pharmaceutical industries concluded that patents were vital for pharmaceutical
industries because expenditure in research and development of new drugs would be
reduced by 64% if there were no patents.[15]
In another classical study, Mansfield concluded that 68% of new
pharmaceutical innovations between 1981 and 1983 would not have been developed
without a patent system, far ahead than other industries.[16]
Despite the
undeniable importance of patents, the amount of money spent on research and
development does not seem to match the profits earned by the pharmaceutical
industry. Representatives from the industry calculate that the amount of money
invested in research and development totals $30 billion USD globally per year,
being only 7.3% of the total estimated income for 2002.[17]
What is more, the amount of money spent on research by the private sector does
not really seem that impressive when compared to the amount spent by the public
sector. As an example, in 1997 the pharmaceutical companies in the
United
States spent a total of $18.9 billion USD in
research, while the leading public sector research institution, the National
Institute of Health (NIH), spent $12.7 billion USD on that same year.[18]
Another
indication of the relative under-funding in research and development by the
pharmaceutical industry is that a considerable proportion of the research
funding for pharmaceutical companies comes from the public sector. A study in
the United
States, examining drugs developed between 1991
and 1997, found 30 new drugs classified as offering significant gains in
therapy. Half of these were found to have been developed with public financial
involvement at some stage of their research, and of those 15 drugs, 11 were
financially funded through all of the stages of research.[19]
Furthermore, public funding is likely to be more critical where research is in
areas of less certain commercial return. As Love and Nader state, “The
federal government plays a particularly important role in the highest risk
research projects, including basic research, where commercial payoffs are least
certain.”[20]
Despite these
figures, the pharmaceutical industry claims that the research expenses are
cumulative, arguing that it takes an average of 15 years to develop new
medicines. It is estimated that any new drug will have cost the pharmaceutical
companies anywhere from $10 million USD up to $500 million USD.[21]
However, a study by TuftsUniversity and sponsored by PhRMA
concluded that each new drug costs an average $802 million USD.[22]
This study has been seriously criticised by consumer organisations and other
health concern groups.[23]
In particular, a study by Love and the Consumer Project on Technology (CPT)
found that this figure is completely at odds with the information disclosed by
pharmaceutical companies to the US tax authorities.[24]
Something else that appears to be at odds with the research and development
figures provided by the pharmaceutical industry is the fact that very few new
chemical compounds are developed each year, in contrast with the considerable
amount of pharmaceutical patents awarded. This is the concept of “ever-greening”
already existing chemicals. Correa comments:
The
pharmaceutical industry significantly exploits incremental innovations through
the development and patenting of a large number of improvements or minor changes
on existing drugs, often in order to extend the effective term of protection for
the original invention (”ever-greening”).[25]
Dutfield
agrees with this point, and further comments that these practices establish
“exclusion zones” that provide a competitive and bargaining advantage for patent
owners.[26]
The cumulative nature of the pharmaceutical market, coupled with other
restrictive competitive practices, such as the existence of drug cartels,[27]
serve to further undermine the argument that asserts the industry’s pricing
schemes and profits.
Another reason
given by the pharmaceutical companies to support the pricing scheme is the
Schumpeterian hypothesis, which roughly states that market power held by large
corporations serves to stimulate innovations because the corporation is more
capable of spending more on research and development. Indeed, R&D spending
seems to rise more or less proportionally with a company’s size after a certain
level has been passed, but as Symeonidis points out, “there seems to be
little empirical support for the view that large firm size or high concentration
are factors generally conducive to a higher level of innovative activity.”[28]
The figures presented earlier regarding the research spending by the
pharmaceutical companies would seem to corroborate this observation.[29]
Taking this
into consideration, it is difficult to establish the reasons why the prices of
pharmaceuticals remain as high as to maintain the substantial profits that have
been described. Some argue that there is evidence that the pharmaceutical market
is very similar to a monopolistic one because of the protection awarded by
patents. Lall points out that “the pricing policies of the large drug firms
are based on purely monopolistic principles (…) rather than on the socially
responsible one of lowering them after recovering research costs.”[30]
The common denominator seems to be the holding of a patent. Several studies
cited by Reekie and Weber demonstrate that while a company holds a patent, the
prices remain considerably high, and usually do not change whatsoever during the
lifetime of the right. Prices only fall once the product is no longer under
patent protection and can be manufactured by anybody else.[31]
This is the reason why the production of generic medicines – medicines that are
not protected by patents – is a much more competitive and cheaper market.
Grabowski points out that:
…the
development costs of generic compounds are relatively modest. In the
United
States, and most other countries, generic
compounds must only show that they are bio-equivalent to the pioneering brand to
receive market registration. This process only takes a few years and costs one
to two million dollars.[32]
If generic
medicines are cheaper to produce and result in a more competitive market, one
should expect to see more generic production of pharmaceuticals after patents
have expired. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case, as it would
appear that generics are treated in many markets as separate products that
require bureaucratic approval, making their implementation in a market much more
difficult.[33]
Others claim that pharmaceutical companies dedicated to the production of
generic drugs are often in direct competition with the innovation companies, and
therefore making the generic market a much less profitable one because the
proprietary industry has an advantage by their reliance in patented materials.[34]
This indicates that patenting of medicines will continue because it is the most
profitable development method.
The existing
proprietary system of pharmaceutical development based on patents has the end
result of the existence of a market ruled by profits, with the price of even
life-saving drugs determined by market forces. This has serious effects in the
developing world. This situation means that drug prices remain too high for the
most impoverished nations of the world. All around the developing world the
evidence of the problem of drug pricing is evident. A
report by Oxfam offers this example:
Two
million children die every year from pneumonia, almost all of them in developing
countries. US-based Pfizer's best-selling antibiotic, azithromycin (Zithromax),
is particularly good for treating child pneumonia. It is under patent in
Kenya, where it costs as much
as in Norway. But Kenya only spends US$17 per head every year on
healthcare, while Norway spends US$2300.[35]
Drugs that are
basic for the health in the developing world are at the moment unattainable. A
study sponsored by the charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has found
that several drugs required to treat common illnesses in the poorer countries
are priced out of reach of the developing world. An example offered states that:
A
recent study of bacterial meningitis caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae in
children aged 2 months to 3 years demonstrated that use of ceftriaxone sodium
could reduce mortality from 66% to 32% compared with treatment with
chloramphenicol in oily suspension. Both antibiotics have a sustained action and
require very simple protocols (daily intramuscular injection for a short time)
and therefore are equally easy to use in adverse conditions. However,
ceftriaxone treatment is 10 times more expensive than chloramphenicol.[36]
This is
important because acute respiratory infections kill almost 4 million people per
year in the developing world, and as it has shown, ceftriaxone sodium is too
expensive. The same situation can be found with diarrhoeal diseases, which kill
2.5 million people per year. A bacterial disease that has led to several
outbreaks in developing countries is shigella dyseneriae, which has a
mortality rate of 15% if left untreated. The strain of bacteria responsible has
developed resistance to most antibiotics. The only ones that remain effective
are fluoroquinolones such as ciprofloaxin and niprofloaxin, but these cost $25
USD per dosage, instead of the $2 USD for other regular antibiotics.[37]
There also
appears to be a severe drug pricing discrepancy between developed and developing
countries. For example, Balasubramaniam points out that retail prices are often
considerably higher in developing countries than in developed ones, with some
countries experiencing prices that are four times higher than the recommended
manufacturer price.[38]
The reason for this seems to be an attempt by the pharmaceutical industry to
maximise profits in economies that do not purchase their products in the same
volume than developed nations. A spokesman of the British pharmaceutical
industry expressed this by saying that “…the reason multinational companies
try to grab back as much profit as possible out of the less developed countries
is frankly because they are suspicious of the future stability of their
operations there.”[39]
The most
worrying case of pricing medicines beyond reach, and perhaps the most publicised
in the last years, is the case of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS),
caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). By December 2001, an estimated
40 million people around the world carried HIV or have developed AIDS; 95% of
those are in developing countries, and 30 million have died from the disease. Of
those totals, 28.1 million people had been infected in Sub-Saharan Africa alone,
with an estimate of 3.4 million added each year.[40]
According to a joint study published by the WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDs and MSF, the
high cost of HIV drugs is prohibitive for most of the countries in the
developing world. The study has identified several reasons for the high cost of
these medicines. According to the study, these are:
—
Patents
—
Limited volume
—
Limited price competition
— High
import duties, tariffs, and local taxes
— High
mark-ups for wholesaling, distribution, and dispensing
—
Individual country pricing strategies—for example, price fixing by the
government, policies of price freedom for new products or even agreements with
industry on profit control.[41]
According to
the study, the price of a full treatment per person per year can range from
$10,000 to $15,000 USD with medicines purchased in the developed world,
depending on what type of treatment is taken.[42]
This is certainly beyond the budget of the countries that have been affected the
most by the epidemic. The average per capita annual income for Africa is only
$510 USD, and in some affected countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Madagascar, more
than 65% of the population lives with less than $1 USD a day.[43]
Another report by the Washington Post
calculates that, at current market drug prices, the cost of treating the entire
population living with HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe – one of the most affected
countries – would be $18 billion USD, 265% of the Gross National Product (GNP)
for that country. In contrast, the cost of treating all of the people infected
in Switzerland is only $144 million USD,
as the infected population is only 12,000 people, representing only 0.06% of the
country’s GNP.[44]
Geographical
variations in prices of the same drug are also interesting to compare.
GlaxoSmithKline's Retrovir costs £125 British Pounds (GBP) in the
UK, but the same drug costs as little
as £54 GBP if imported from other European countries. Another example is that
“in Brazil, the drug
Fluconazole is available for US$1, whereas in South Africa it
costs US$20. A 1998 study by the Consumer Project on Technology found prices for
GlaxoSmithKline's version of Amoxil was $8 in Pakistan, but was $36 in Malaysia.”[45]
Another
problem faced by the developing countries is that some drugs developed for
combating tropical diseases are not being produced any more because they are no
longer profitable. Some of these drugs were developed decades ago and are no
longer subject to patents; however, they are not in use in the developed
countries where those diseases are rare.[46]
The problem is made more acute not only by the pricing scheme and lack of
availability, but by the marked lack of research and development of drugs for
diseases that affect the developing world. For example, a report in 1996 by the
World Health Organization (WHO) says that “of the $56 billion spent on
health-related research and development worldwide, only 0.2 percent is spent on
pneumonia, diarrhoeal diseases and tuberculosis - which together represent 18
percent of the global disease burden.”[47]
Even countries
with adequate levels of development can be hit suddenly when there is a
disadvantageous economic shift. This is illustrated by the recent economic
crisis in Argentina, which has been suffering
one of the worse recessions in its history, with runaway inflation and a
disastrous devaluation of the national currency. One of the many problems that
have arisen for the Argentinean society is that suddenly people cannot afford
medicines. This is illustrated by the fact that since the start of the crisis no
insulin was available anywhere in the country, as the pharmacies, the
government, and distributors could not afford to import it from abroad. The
problem is that diabetics usually buy insulin supplies for about 120 days, but
because of the devaluation, pharmacies are not accepting pre-orders, or giving
credit. Any person who is ill has to be able to pay $150 USD upfront, as the
chemists are not accepting the national currency. This has reached such alarming
stages that the Argentinean government had to declare a state of emergency and
ask for insulin donations from abroad. The crisis is deepened by the fact that a
total of 30% of the pharmacies in Argentina have had to close down.
Hospitals are even finding it difficult to obtain even the most basic supplies,
such as antibiotics, vaccines, gauze and needles.[48]
Seeing how
medicine prices affect health statistics, it should come as no surprise that
many developing countries have been trying to get around the status quo and
challenging the international patent stranglehold in different ways,
particularly by attempting to generate their own national pharmaceutical
industries. Needless to say, the countries that have managed to achieve this are
generally large developing countries, or countries with somewhat sophisticated
R&D capabilities that enable them to imitate chemicals created in
industrialised nations. The efforts of three developing countries to generate
local pharmaceutical capabilities will be analysed next.
Costa
Rica is one of the
first developing countries to adopt a social health policy, which included a
program to provide affordable medicines to the poorest sectors of this Central
American country. As a matter of fact, the country has been put forward as an
example for a workable drugs policy that can have positive effects on health. As
stated by Chetley: “Can the products of the pharmaceutical industry help to
improve health?Some of them can, as Costa Rica has
shown through the judicious use of vaccines and a handful of other carefully
selected medicines.”[49]
It was back in
1941 that the Costa Rican Congress approved legislation to create the Caja
Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS), an autonomous government institution
dedicated to manage the public healthcare system in Costa Rica. One
of the first actions of the health system was to establish a public pharmacy in
one of the main hospitals where patients would be able to obtain cheap medicines
provided by the State.[50]
The system of providing cheap or sponsored medicines continues to this day
throughout the country, with several basic types of preventive medicine being
awarded for free.[51]
Costa
Rica has managed to
ensure that the larger areas of the population have access to required medicines
by following a double strategy. The first aspect of this strategy is to provide
access to generic drugs either produced in the country or imported. These
generic drugs are cheaper as they are produced without ties to patent licensing,
which, as discussed, have the usual effect of making drugs more expensive. The
second aspect is the importation of patented medications, but selling them at
cheaper prices by providing a State funded subvention.[52]
Access to
generic drugs was not a problem with the existing patent legislations of the
country, as it was deemed that there was an overriding necessity to provide
access to basic medicaments to even the poorest sectors of the country. In
particular, the patent legislation allows for two legal mechanisms that permit
the State to use generic medication. One is by granting compulsory licensing (licencia obligatoria), which will take
place when the patent owner has not made use of or licensed his invention. Any
individual or company can then request that the State recognises a compulsory
patent if it fulfils certain procedural requirements.[53]
There is also an option for granting patents for public use, which means that
the government can grant, by executive decree, a public licence for the
exploitation of a patent by the State or any other parties specifically named in
cases of public interest, emergency or national security. This would certainly
include the patenting of medicines in case of public need. However, the State
will grant compensation to the patent owner in case it decides to follow this
procedure.[54]
The existing
regime has had a tremendous impact in the capabilities of the Costa Rican social
health service to provide low sot medicines to the population. It is calculated
that by 2002, the CCSS spent $67 million USD in medicines from approximately 100
suppliers, and this figure makes up 80% of the entire Costa Rican pharmaceutical
market.[55]
It is calculated that this expenditure is particularly strong in generic drugs.
The CCSS spends 33% of its budget to purchase medicines in patented or branded
pharmaceuticals, while the remaining 67% goes to purchase generic medicines from
generic suppliers.[56]
The Costa Rican generic industry has been growing considerably, enhancing their
imitation capabilities thanks to the acquiring power of the social health
service. Of the four largest suppliers to the CCSS, three are the national
generic companies Stein, Gutis and Raven, which provide 28.44% of the medicines
purchased by the health service.[57]
In total, the CCSS provides a total of 45 million doses of medicines per year.[58]
The importance
of generic drugs for the Costa Rican health service cannot be denied. For
example, the price of the patented version of paclitaxel, a chemical used in the
treatment of AIDS is $160 USD per unit, while its generic equivalent costs $25
USD, which has allowed decreasing the annual cost per person from $6,800 USD to
$1,300 USD.[59]
The mentioned
provisions have made a remarkable difference in public health figures in
Costa
Rica. In 1940 the child mortality rate in the
country was 123 per thousand births. In 1950, just nine years after the
implementation of a social health system, this figure had come down to 90/1000.
The figures continued to decrease steadily, until in 1970 the figure was
61/1000, and in 1980 it had decreased to levels comparable to those of developed
countries at 19/1000.[60]
Infant mortality under five in 2001 was 9/1000. Similar success can be seen in
the life expectancy figures. In 1940, the life expectancy in the country was of
46.9 years. In 1950 the figure rose to 55.6 years, in 1970 it was 65.4, and in
2003 it is 77.9 years.[61]
It is
difficult to measure the extent to which these figures can be attributed
directly to the Costa Rican medicine policies, but there can be no doubt that
wide access to some vital medicines – in particular antibiotics and vaccines –
has played an important part in achieving these impressive advances in public
health statistics. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the Costa
Rican improvement in these basic health figures is far better than the increases
in the same data experienced on average around the developing world. In 1970,
the average child mortality rate in the less developed countries was of
109/1000, and in 1999 it had been reduced to 59/1000. Life expectancy was 55
years in average, and in 1999 it had risen to 64 years.[62]
The case of
India is very interesting for
two reasons; India is one of the most populous
countries in the world, and large sectors of its population live under
exceptionally poor conditions. For the year 2003, India was ranked
127th in the Human Development Index, an appalling showing for a
country with such high potential development.[63]
Nevertheless, India has experienced some
improvement in some basic statistics. For example, in 1973 more than half of the
Indian population lived below the poverty line, which amounted to 54.9% of the
total population. In 1999 the same figure had been reduced to 26.1%, a
considerable improvement.[64]
Before 1970,
the state of the drug policy in India mirrored that of most of the
developing world, with considerable reliance on the importation of medicines
from developed countries. In fact, India produced locally only 25% of
the total medicines consumed in the country.[65]
It was in that year that India passed a new Patents Act. It
has been argued that this Act has:
…greatly weakened intellectual property protection in
India, particularly for
pharmaceutical innovations. Pharmaceutical product innovations, as well as those
for food and agrochemicals, became unpatentable, allowing innovations patented
elsewhere to be freely copied and marketed in India. The
statutory term was shortened to 5 to 7 years on pharmaceutical process patents
and automatic licensing was put in place.[66]
This
legislation, disallowing the existence of product patents, had two different
effects on the Indian pharmaceutical market. Firstly, local generic production
of pharmaceuticals increased considerably; and secondly, foreign pharmaceutical
companies decreased the amount of patents they had as they deemed that it was
not worthwhile to manufacture under the existing legal conditions in the
country. By 1991, Indian companies produced 70% of the drugs available in the
national market.[67]
The drug policy in India also emphasised some price
control policies, with at least 74 different medicines protected by government
pricing restrictions. The justification for this policy is to ensure wider
access to and availability of essential drugs within the country.[68]
These policies
so far have been very successful in keeping prices down when compared to other
countries. For example, the antacid drug ranitinide can be found in the West as
the patented drug Zantac, but in India it is produced generically. The
drug is 26 times more expensive in the UK than in India, and 56 times more expensive in the
United
States. The antibiotic ciprofloxacin is also
produced generically in India, and it is up to 15 times cheaper than in
the UK and the
United
States.[69]
Another important achievement of the Indian drugs policy is its potential for
exporting cheap drugs to developing countries. For example:
Cipla, an Indian generic drug manufacturer, offered to supply
triple-combination therapy for HIV/AIDS for $350 per patient per year to
Medicins San Frontieres. It also offered to sell the therapy for $600 per
patient per year to poor governments, on the condition that the recipient
governments provide the drugs for free to those with HIV/AIDS.[70]
Since the
implementation of the 1970 Patent Act, various health indicators have improved.
In 1970 the child mortality rate was 137.2 deaths per thousand births, and in
the year 2001 it had fallen to 67/1000. The average life expectancy in 1970 was
49.4 years, and by the year 2001 it had increased to 63.3.[71]
This substantial improvement in health statistics cannot be attributed solely to
the country’s pharmaceutical policy, and it is impossible to measure just how
effective the policy has been in providing cheap medicines, but there cannot be
any doubt that wider access to drugs has been one of the factors that have
allowed India to improve these figures. In
the end, as expressed by Mira Shiva, an expert on pharmaceutical drugs with the
Voluntary Health Association of India (VHAI), “India's thriving drug
industry has provided a good example of how drugs can be produced cheaply and
profitably for local markets when unburdened by exorbitant licensing
fees.”[72]
Despite
serious challenges by developed countries – in particular the
United States – and
multinational pharmaceutical companies, India had been set to continue
providing cheap access to drugs to its population. The government has repeatedly
stated that among its main goals in the area of medicine there has to be a
serious emphasis in attempting to provide cheap access to drugs, and to
encourage research and development of new drugs by Indian companies.[73]
However, the international pressure has finally produced some results and
India is being forced to comply with
international protection standards and to include in their legislation
protection to product patents. Arguably, this is going to threaten the large
generic market. Some reforms are on the way, but they are to be fewer than
expected.[74]
Brazil is an
oddity as far as developing countries goes, with a large population and
impressive natural resources, yet with serious distribution problems.
Brazil’s economy is plagued by
inequality, corruption, high inflation and devaluation. In the year 2001,
Brazil was considered a medium
development country by the UNDP, being placed 69th in the Human Development
Index.
Brazil was
one of the original signatories of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Patents, and ratified the agreement in July 7, 1884. As such it has
been part of the international patent protection system, although in a lax
manner. The modern Brazilian pharmaceutical policy dates back to the
implementation of the 1971 Code of Industrial Property, which covered everything
relating to patents. Although this legislation complied with most of the prior
recommendations set by the Paris Agreement, it made two very important
exceptions, as pharmaceuticals and food were not covered by either product or
process patent system.[75]
This meant that the national pharmaceutical industry could produce cheap
versions of patented drugs and make them available to the local market.
Besides the
specific exception to pharmaceuticals, the Brazilian legislation was able to
provide several other provisions to safeguard the widest possible access to
medicines to its population by means of many other legal mechanisms, such as a
comprehensive system of compulsory licensing. The Brazilian legislation required
a patent owner to work or effectively exploit a patent in the country; merely
importing a patented product into Brazil did not constitute effective
exploitation of the patent. This meant that any interested party could, with
very little effort, claim that a patent was not being exploited, thus being
granted a compulsory licence.[76]
The government could also grant compulsory licences in cases of public interest,
but this would be a non-exclusive right and could be exploited by any other
interested party, the rationale behind this being cases of national security or
health.[77]
A new patent
legislation was passed in 1996, with the main change that it allowed for the
patenting of pharmaceuticals, but retained the provisions on compulsory
licensing due to disuse or for public interest.[78]
In those respects, Brazilian law does not differ much from the provisions that
can be found in other developing countries, such as the mentioned cases of
India and Costa Rica.
Perhaps one of
the most interesting features of the Brazilian legislation is that it
specifically allows for the existence of parallel imports. Article 68(3) and (4)
of the Brazilian patents legislation allows for the existence of parallel
imports into the Brazilian market. The article states “In case of
importation, in order to exploit a patent or importation in the preceding
paragraph, third parties shall also be allowed to import a product manufactured
according to a process patent or a product patent, provided it has been placed
on the market directly by the patent owner or with his consent.”[79]
This means that if a pharmaceutical is made available in a market, then
Brazil can import it from that market
with no legal complications.
To complement
the compulsory licensing and parallel imports provisions in Brazil, there is
legislation that specifically allows the country to produce its own generic
version of patented drugs. The legal framework for this was initially set by
executive decree number 793 of April 5 1993, which allows for generic drugs to
be produced by authorised manufacturers in accordance with the compulsory
licensing provisions described, and established a system of registration for
such pharmaceuticals. The system was later made into law in 1999.[80]
With the legal
framework in place, the Brazilian government started to encourage the production
of several drugs in the country, with the main efforts being directed towards
producing medicines to treat HIV/AIDS, which poses a large health concern.
Brazil has the largest
population infected with HIV in Latin America,
with an estimated 540,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in 1999.[81]
Soon after, Brazilian pharmaceutical companies sponsored by the government were
producing several anti-retrovirals and other medicines to decrease the effects
of the disease, including very expensive patented drugs such as nevirapine, AZT
and 3TC. With the use of these generic drugs, the price of a complete treatment
has been drastically reduced when compared to countries with patented medicines,
averaging $1.55 USD per day – as opposed to an average $40 USD a day in
developed nations. Brazil also provides a cocktail of 12
different drugs for free to more than 100,000 people who cannot afford them.[82]
There are many indications that point towards the success of the Brazilian
generic HIV drugs policy. The number of deaths caused by AIDS has been reduced
by up to 50% since 1996, and 146,000 patients have avoided hospitalisation since
1997.[83]
Just as with
the other countries mentioned, the open pharmaceutical policy in
Brazil has been translated in gradual
increase in health statistics. In 1970 infant mortality was 96/1000 births, and
the life expectancy was of 59 years. In 2001 the infant mortality stood at
36.96/1000 births, and life expectancy had risen to 67 years.[84]
As shown in
the previous section, some countries have started to take steps to provide large
parts of their populations with basic medicines, but the pharmaceutical
multinational companies did not take these efforts lightly. Making use of the
impressive political and economic power that they possess, some of these
companies started to act against some of the countries that they believed did
not provide adequate protection for their patented products.
The strategy
of the pharmaceutical industry appears to be clear. The industry is using the
political influence they have in the United States to try to get the
American government to send a message to some developed nations by threatening
them with trade sanctions through the aforementioned Special 301 status.
An example of
a country that is suffering such the threat of the trade sanctions
India, which has been named as a
Priority Foreign Country by the USTR in the last four years, mostly because of
its generic pharmaceutical policies. PhRMA is setting its sights on
India by continually requesting that
they be placed on the list. In their latest recommendations to the
US government, they complain
that:
The
damage caused by the inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in
India reaches beyond direct
losses caused by displaced sales in India. Indian bulk pharmaceutical
companies aggressively export their products to third countries where
intellectual property laws are similarly lax. The damage caused to U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers due to the deficiencies of the Indian patent regime
thus goes beyond displaced sales in the Indian market, and reaches to the
ability of U.S. companies to compete in other significant markets, especially in
the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions.[85]
The United
States has already taken India to the WTO arbitration procedures in 1998, and
they won when the WTO appellate body found that Indian pharmaceutical provisions
described earlier contravened India’s responsibilities within the WTO.[86]
The second
strategy is to place court cases in other countries to get some legislation
repealed. The third and less obvious strategy is to mount a public relations
campaign to gain public support to the above-mentioned policies, getting into a
rhetorical game of blaming the victim. To them the problem is not that drugs are
too expensive and cannot be afforded by the less developed countries, the
problem is that those countries have too many internal problems and cannot
provide for their own citizens adequately. As stated in one of the web sites run
by the industry advocate PhRMA, “Criticisms of drug patents deflect attention
from the real barriers to health care — poverty, inadequate infrastructure,
flawed health systems, cultural barriers and political corruption.”[87]This shifts the blame of the problem on
the affected countries themselves and the corruption they face. Corruption is
indeed a real threat and must not be under-estimated. Responding to public
outrages, some pharmaceutical companies started sending drugs to African
countries as humanitarian aid. A worrying recent report informs that a large
shipment of anti-retroviral drugs produced by GlaxoSmithKline intended for the
Ivory Coast,
Senegal, Togo and the Republic of Congo were seized by corrupt officials and sent back
to Europe to be resold. The culprits of this
outrage appear to be officials in the receiving ports, and similarly corrupt
Western traders.[88]
It is extremely worrying that such negative experiences may hinder future
efforts to provide assistance to AIDS ravaged nations.
Because of the
amount of political power held by the pharmaceutical industry in the
United
States, as examined earlier, there has been a
marked effort by the representatives of the industry to request trade sanctions
against several countries.
The
United
States trade legislation that allows the legal
imposition of trade sanctions against countries that do not protect intellectual
property becomes particularly relevant in this case. As discussed above, every
year the pharmaceutical industry watchdog in the United States
writes a report about the countries that should be awarded with Special 301
status, and lists others that should be watched. For the last four years, PhRMA
has been complaining about Brazil, recommending that it should
be included in the “Priority Watch List”.[89]
For the year
2001, PhRMA complained about two different situations in Brazil that
affected their share of the market. The main complaint concerned the regulations
described in the previous section in regards to compulsory licences and the
granting of powers to create generic versions of patented medicines. PhRMA
claimed these powers contravene regulations in the TRIPS agreement. The other
complaint referred to temporary measures implemented by the Brazilian government
in 1999. Due to the serious economic crisis in Brazil, the
government adopted a series of temporary measures that have frozen drugs prices
by only allowing an increase of 4.4% in prices in comparison with the previous
year. This is way below devaluation and inflation rates.[90]
The complaints
against Brazil should come as
no surprise, as the country has the largest potential market in South America, for the pharmaceutical industry.
Multinational corporations made a total of $7.2 billion USD in 1998, which
dropped to $5.3 billion USD in 1999 and $5.5 billion USD in the year 2000,
mostly due to the economic crisis in the country and the marked increase in the
generic drugs market.[91]
The potential share of such a market by the pharmaceutical companies is such
that the United States decided to stage a trade dispute in April 2000 at the WTO
against the Brazilian patent regulations that allow parallel imports and
compulsory licensing, requesting that the WTO set up a panel to investigate
these issues.[92]
The arguments
put forward in this case were simple. The United
States pointed out that Article 68 (1)(i) allowed for
compulsory licences to be established in the case where the patent had not been
exploited in Brazil three years after the patent
was issued. This, according to the United States, was in breach of
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS agreement, which states that “patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.”[93]
The use of this article by the United States would appear erroneous, as what the
Brazilian legislation is doing is not to create a discrimination against the
patent, but to establish certain limits if the patent is not properly worked
locally. This is perfectly accepted by other patent agreements, such as the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. In particular, Art.
5(A)(4) clearly states that:
A
compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or
insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the
date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the
grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.[94]
It is clear
that by reading both treaties, the Brazilian legislation does not violate
international patent protection provisions, and the argument has no merit.
The case
produced considerable protest from NGOs and AIDS activists, as it was deemed
that the action had been taken against the Brazilians to set them up as an
example to other countries because they had been producing generic AIDS
medicines.[95]
Despite this, it is important to note that the United States
denies that this dispute is about the generic medicines, stating that it was
only against the compulsory licensing and parallel import provisions of the
Brazilian patent legislation. In a letter by an American trade representative to
an AIDS advocate group, it is stated that “this dispute is not about health
or access to drugs.It is about a
measure that discriminates against imported products in favor of locally
produced products, regardless of whether these products are health-related or
not.”[96]
The
United
States abandoned this dispute in June 2001.[97]
The reasons for this are unclear; it may be a combination of factors. Maybe this
was a response to the international outrage and the accusations of bullying by
an economic power to a country attempting to fight AIDS, and maybe even a
realisation that the case was not strong to begin with. What is evident is that
the action was initiated as the direct result of the pressure exerted by the
pharmaceutical industry, and in particular by the influential writings of PhRMA.
Indeed, Shanker points out that several official studies from the American
government are influenced by the drugs industry, stating that in those studies
“practically every piece of information pertaining to U.S.
pharmaceutical companies was taken from PhRMA’s publications.”[98]
The case of
South Africa has become one
of the most publicised in recent years due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in
Africa. In South Africa
alone, the situation is dire; from a population of 40 million, it is believed
that 4.5 million people have been infected. This translates to more than 10% of
the total population, and almost 20% of those aged 15-49, being the country with
the largest living infected inhabitants in the entire world.[99]
This is a
heavy toll for a developing country, more so when the high prices for retroviral
medicines used to treat the symptoms are taken into consideration.
South
Africa is ranked 111th place in the
2003 HDI, and although some of their statistics are not as worrying as many
other Sub-Saharan African countries, health is certainly an issue. The per
capita income for South Africa is $11,290 USD per year, with a life expectancy
of 53.7 years and an under-five infant mortality rate of 71/1000 births. One of
the main causes for these worrying figures is the AIDS epidemic. With so many
health problems, it is doubly worrying to point out that the per capita health
expenditure is $663 USD per year, with the public percentage expenditure in
relation to the Gross Domestic Product of only 3.7%.[100]
Faced with
such an epidemic and lack of resources to deal with it properly,
South
Africa started to look for cheaper sources of
supply for anti-retroviral pharmaceuticals to try to alleviate the problem. The
1978 Patent Act already allowed for compulsory licensing in the cases of abuse
of the patent owner’s rights, not dissimilar to the provisions already in
existence in other developing countries.[101]
However, the conditions for the granting of a compulsory licence were very
narrow, such as in cases of disuse, abuse or the refusal to grant a patent.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Act allowed also for the granting
of a compulsory licence if “the demand in the Republic for the patented
article is being met by importation and the price charged by the patentee, his
licensee or agent for the patented article is excessive in relation to the price
charged therefore in countries where the patented article is manufactured by or
under licence from the patentee or his predecessor or successor in title.”[102]
This would seem to open the door for granting patents in case a product was
being offered at a higher price in South Africa than in the country of origin,
but it is still rather restrictive in the amount of cases in which such licences
could be granted. Another problem present in the Patent Act was that it did not
allow for compulsory licensing in cases of public interest, as is the case in
other of the studied cases.
As the
existing system limited the options that could be taken, the South African
government attempted to address the crisis by passing a new regulation in 1997.
This new legislation gave wider powers to the Department of Health to make
exceptions to the existing patent law in cases of health emergencies facing the
country, in the form of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment
Act. Among the many provisions of the new legislation, the most important appear
to be those that allow for parallel imports of patented and generic
pharmaceuticals into South
Africa in an effort to ensure access by the
public to more affordable medicines. The most controversial article of the Act
states that:
The
Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in
certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in
particular may-
(a)
notwithstanding anything to the contrary […], determine that the rights with
regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend
to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market by the
owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent;
(b)
prescribe the conditions on which any medicine […] may be imported.[103]
This opened
the door for both parallel imports and generic imports of medicines, which was
not possible with earlier legislation. With the legal framework in place,
South Africa started
importing small quantities of cheap anti-retroviral drugs from
Brazil,[104]
but the country is still suffering from a serious lack of access to these
drugs.
Even before
the implementation of the new patent provisions, representatives from
pharmaceutical companies and the United States government made several
comments to the South African government and the press warning them that the
provisions included in the new legislation went against international treaties
on patent protection.[105]
These warning went unheeded and the Act was passed and signed by then president
Nelson Mandela in November 1998, and was scheduled to enter into effect in April
1999.
Because of the
implementation of the new Act, 42 pharmaceutical companies brought a case to the
South African High Court on February 1999, requesting that the provisions
regarding compulsory licensing, parallel imports and the special powers granted
to health authorities to circumvent patent legislation in cases of public
interest, should be invalidated.[106]
One of the
first requests of the action was that the court should issue an injunction
stopping the new legislation from coming into effect. This was granted by the
Court, leaving the provisions on stand-by until the court case was solved. The
claimants also requested that the case should be referred to the Constitutional Court
for analysis of the alleged unconstitutionality of several parts of the new law.
Although claims were brought against several of the articles of the 1998 Act,
the main target was Article 15c, which has been described already. The reasons
for requesting invalidation on the grounds of unconstitutionality were as
follows:
a) The
article did not set any policy guidelines for the declaration of making drugs
more accessible to the public.
b) The
proposed changes give the Minister of Health powers to restrict the scope of
existing patent rights in South Africa.
c) The
article allows the South African government to deprive intellectual property
right holders without specifying rules for compensation.
d) The
provisions in the article go against the Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement,
which is a ratified treaty by the Republic of South
Africa.
The response
by the South African government was that parallel imports were not specifically
forbidden by the TRIPS agreement, and that the provisions in the new Act were
not unconstitutional. The defendants conceded the point regarding compulsory
licensing, arguing that the article in question would not be used for that
purpose, but only for parallel import, arguably because the legal team
representing the government thought that this concession would give them a
better chance of winning the case.[107]
On September
8, 1999, the High Court remitted the case to the Constitutional Court
as requested. Instead of entering into analysis of the validity of the
unconstitutional claims made by the pharmaceutical companies, the Court first
ruled on other claims of irregularities regarding the implementation of the Act
(scheduled for April of that year). The Court was asked if such implementation
would be legal under the Constitution, as the South African legislative body had
not yet passed several procedural mechanisms that should accompany the Act.[108]
On these procedural requirements, the Court eventually ruled that the previous
legislation on the control of medicines would stay in place until the President
determined a date for bringing the new Act into force.[109]
This was the first blow to the pharmaceutical companies.
The Court held
hearings between March 4 and 6, 2001, where both sides presented their cases,
and several affidavits and amici curiae were also read. On the final day of
proceedings, the claimants presented a request for recess, which the Court
accepted. This was the last legal action the Court would hear from this case.
From the start
of the legal dispute, the case had been receiving a large amount of media
attention. This publicity was not complimentary to the pharmaceutical companies;
the lawsuit seemed like a straightforward case of corporate greed against a
country crippled by the scourge of the AIDS epidemic. The common denominator in
many of the articles seemed to be that the pharmaceutical companies were putting
profits before human lives, an instant headline grabber.[110]
At the same
time, NGOs, AIDS charities, anti-globalisation activists and many other pressure
groups took the side of South Africa and started campaigning hard against the
lawsuit.[111]
The pharmaceutical companies found themselves fighting a lonely war on the
battlefield of public opinion, an engagement that they seemed doomed to lose.
In the end the
public pressure won. It is entirely possible that the industry considered that
such bad press might be detrimental for future cases in which they would try to
protect their intellectual property rights. It could also be that an increase in
bad press in the developed world, in particular in Europe and the
United
States, may have worried some companies about
losing political influence, or even a backlash that could result in stricter
price regulation, something they have thoroughly opposed in the past.
The fact is
that on April 19, 2001, the pharmaceutical companies abandoned their case and
settled with the South African government. The terms of the settlement were
described as beneficial to all parties by several observers, and were welcomed
with almost universal approval around the world. In the end, the pharmaceutical
industry could claim that the South African government agreed to hold talks with
their representatives regarding the future implementation of the new Medicines
Act. The South African government obtained assurances that the pharmaceutical
companies would not pursue the matter and would be understanding of the South
African AIDS situation. The statement says:
The
government of the Republic of South Africa reiterates its commitment to honour
its international obligations including the Agreement of Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In reliance of this commitment, the
referenced applicants recognize and reaffirm that the Republic of South Africa
may enact national laws or regulations, including regulations implementing Act
90 of 1997 or adopt measures necessary to protect public health, and broaden
access to medicines in accordance with the South African Constitution and
TRIPS.[112]
Although the
drug companies claimed a partial victory, it seems obvious that the victory was
really for the South African government, as there was a direct recognition that
the articles in question could remain as they were. Because of that reason, this
settlement has been welcomed and reported as a victory for the developing world
against multinational corporations.
Since the year
2000, the United
States has been pursuing another strategy with
regards to international trade that has severe implications for the access to
medicines debate. The
United States has been
signing bilateral or multilateral agreements with developing countries in which
the US agrees to provide trade benefits
or assistance to a developing country; with the condition that they sign up to
different sets of trade-related clauses that are designed to protect American
interests in the signing country.[113]
Included in these agreements, there are several clauses relating to intellectual
property rights that provide obligations that go beyond those enshrined in the
TRIPS agreement. This has prompted some commentators to define these agreements
as “TRIPS-plus”.[114]
The content of
the TRIPS-plus agreements vary, but of interest to the issue of access to
medicines are those provisions regarding patents. TRIPS-plus bilateral
agreements enhance the protection awarded by TRIPS through two mechanisms,
particularly the prescription of longer patent protection and the imposition of
severe restriction to the grounds for granting compulsory licences.[115]
The implementation of the bilateral agreements has been boosted by the passing
by the US Congress of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act 2002, which
makes it easier for the USTR to negotiate and conclude these agreements.[116]
A result of the political will and commercial lobbying pushing the TRIPS-plus
agreements forward, there are a growing number of countries that have entered
and concluded such negotiations.[117]
An example of
a bilateral TRIPS-plus agreement is the signing of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade
Agreement, which contains a provision that practically destroys the existence of
compulsory licensing in that South American country.[118]
Of particular interest is Art. 17.9. This article contains provisions that erode
rights existing in TRIPS and other international agreements, including the
following:
-Patent terms can be extended to compensate
for administrative delays.
-Chile can
legislate exceptions to the normal rights granted by a patent, but these
exceptions “do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent”.[119]
-The grounds for revoking a patent are
limited to the same grounds required originally to refuse a patent, eliminating
the ground of non-use.
-Chile can
grant the use of the "subject matter" to a third party only for the purpose of
making an application for "marketing
approval or sanitary permit of a pharmaceutical product."[120]
All of the
above constitute a de facto erosion of compulsory licensing, as it is difficult
to see how a licence could be granted without contravening the above provisions.
A more
efficient strategy has been to negotiate multilateral agreements with blocs of
countries, as it allows for multilateral negotiations that will allow the
United
States to implement some of the enhanced patent
protection to a larger number of countries.[121]
One of the most worrying cases of such multilateral agreements can be found with
the Andean region countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), where the
United States suggested a series of measures that these countries had to
undertake in order to be able to receive monetary assistance for the fight
against drug traffickers and leftist guerrillas.[122]
These countries entered into a trade agreement with the US named the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)[123]
in order to receive the funds and to be able to obtain preferential trade
treatment. The agreement included a clause that would eliminate the practice of
providing protection to generic drugs, ensuring that drugs would receive a
minimum period of protection of five years before being marketed as generic. The
US is also negotiated with
numerous other developing countries in Latin
America. Very tough rules on IPRs are being included in the draft
text for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), where Section 5.5 of the
Draft Chapter on IP Rights contains serious constraints to compulsory
licensing.[124]
The largest
and most controversial multilateral agreement signed to date is the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in early 2004.[125]
CAFTA has been surrounded by controversy because it appears to be a precursor of
the tactics and provisions that will be pushed in the FTAA. Intellectual
property plays a large role in the negotiation of such agreements, and from the
beginning of the negotiations, representatives from Central American developing
countries were warned that IPRs would be one of the most difficult negotiating
points of the agreement, as it was at the top of the American agenda.[126]
CAFTA follows closely the wording of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement with
regards to patents, and most of the provisions have been kept after signing.
This translates to an enhancement of patent protection that erodes the
circumstances in which compulsory licences can be granted. However, there are a
couple of encouraging improvements that have been negotiated into the agreement,
particularly from the initial refusal from Costa Rica to sign the agreement as
it was and by walking out of the negotiations.[127]
One of the main changes from the text of the Chilean FTA is that CAFTA adds one
paragraph to the reasons by which a patent could be struck down. The paragraph
says that “fraud, misrepresentation, or
inequitable conduct may be the basis for revoking, cancelling, or holding a
patent unenforceable.”[128]
Of interest is the use of “inequitable conduct”. This could be used by courts to
cancel patents in which the holder may refuse to commercialise the product in
the country.
What is going
to be the effect of CAFTA to the issue of access to medicines? Even as early as
the negotiating stages, commentators had expressed serious concerns about the
effect that CAFTA would have for the Costa Rican health system. Professional and
industry associations, such as the Medical Association and pharmaceutical
industry representatives, publicly expressed that CAFTA would restrict the use
of generic medicines.[129]
The figures seem to back up such concerns. In 2003 the CCSS had purchased 63
patented medicines at a cost of $23 million USD, while 373 generic medicines had
cost $47 million USD.[130]
Representatives from Costa Rican health services expressed concern that any
change in the current balance would have tremendous effects to the Costa Rican
social health programmes. For example, if the CCSS has to purchase licences for
the use of one widely used medicine such as enapril, this would mean an increase
in $12 million USD per year.[131]
Others have expressed that a substantial reduction in the number of generic
medicines purchased by Costa
Rica would have nefarious effects to the amount
of coverage from the public health system. At present, Costa Rica
boasts that it can provide total coverage of the pharmaceutical needs of the
poorest sectors of the population, but an increase in costs due to expenditure
in patented medicines would mean that the CCSS could only cover 19% of the
poorest inhabitants.[132]
During the
2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting, the participants became aware that health and
the access to medicines debate were of extreme importance for developing
countries. This is the reason why the meeting produced a separate document
regarding health, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, a
document that tries to enforce the importance of health to the international
community. The Declaration starts by commenting that:
We
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.[133]
The
Declaration went as far as to specify a number of flexibilities to be included
within the TRIPS agreement with regards to least developed countries and public
health issues. These flexibilities include:
a) The
provisions of the TRIPS agreement will only be interpreted in light of the
objectives and principles of the Agreement.
b) The member
states will have the right to enact legislation that allows for the granting of
compulsory licensing, and to regulate legislation in whatever form they see fit.
c) The member
states will have the right to determine what they consider a national emergency,
taking into consideration that public health concerns can be considered
such.
d) Each member
state will be able to determine particular situations for the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights within their territory.[134]
It is evident
that these provisions validated most of the policies designed to guarantee the
widest possible access to medicines described in the earlier sections with two
poignant exceptions, the issues of generic drugs and of parallel imports.[135]
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration states that “We recognize that WTO members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could
face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the
TRIPS Agreement.” The Council of TRIPS was given the responsibility of
drafting and implementing a workable set of rules to fix this problem and report
back to the WTO General Council before the end of 2002. Despite all of the positive indications
set by the Declaration, representatives from developed countries successfully
blocked the efforts to achieve an agreement within the Council of TRIPS, which
had the approval of 144 countries.[136]
Recent
developments have been reached thanks to the mounting international public
pressure to resolve this impasse – fuelled by almost universal condemnation of
the aggressive tactics used by the United States during the post-Doha process. A
new agreement reached by the WTO on export of generic drugs was published in
August 2003, just before the Cancun Ministerial Meeting.[137]
This agreement finally managed to implement the Paragraph 6 in the Declaration
to attempt to provide some ways in which developing countries without producing
capabilities would be able to obtain cheap or generic medicines.
Article 31(f)
of TRIPS imposes restrictions on the export of products produced by compulsory
licensing outside the territory in which it is granted. This has generally been
considered as a prohibition on the export of generic drugs that are produced
within a local market, not allowing a developing country to import generics when
they cannot produce them.[138]
The new WTO agreement implemented the recommendation in the Doha Declaration to
allow for a temporary waiver for LDCs, allowing them to export generics under
certain conditions. Another important provision is to continue to encourage the
development of local pharmaceutical industries by means of technology transfer.
The Paragraph 6 agreement states that “Members undertake to cooperate in paying
special attention to the transfer of technology and capacity building in the
pharmaceutical sector…”
The system
will operate in a two-pronged approach. Firstly, countries that are recognised
as LDCs by the WTO will be able to use the paragraph 6 import system at any time
and without needing to notify the TRIPS Council. Secondly, other developing
countries may express their wish to import medicines to the TRIPS Council at any
time, and they need to specify if they will use the system in whole or in a
limited way.[139]
It should be understood that if this agreement provides developing countries
with the opportunity to import generic medicines that have been the subject of
compulsory licences in other countries, it will also mean that this will be a
tacit permission to manufacturing countries to export those medicines to the
countries that have obtained this permission.
These
developments arising from the Declaration must be taken as an excellent sign
that there appears to be a renewed understanding of the importance of medicines
in the international trade environment. Nevertheless, the new rules have been
met with considerable scepticism from NGOs. MSF for example, has complained that
“The United States and other Developed
Economies now have greater opportunities to pressure and stop developing
countries from issuing compulsory licenses.”[140]
It is too
early to ascertain if these fears are warranted, but the signing of this
agreement must be welcomed as one of the most important steps towards providing
access to imported generics by least developed nations that cannot manufacture
them, and it may open the door for more positive steps.
It has become
difficult to attempt to chart the trends in the access to medicines debate.
There have been a number of considerable victories for developing countries
already mentioned, particularly the Doha Health Declaration, the Paragraph 6
Cancun health commitments and the two defeats suffered by the pharmaceutical
companies in Brazil and South Africa. It must also be pointed out that
generally, the TRIPS agreement already includes some important provisions with
respect to access to medicines that allow for some important flexibility awarded
to developing nations. There also appears to be a growing understanding in the
international arena that recognises that there should be a balance between
health and intellectual property rights, and that health should always be given
better treatment when balancing the many interests involved.
On the other
hand, there are some worrying trends taking shape. The Bush administration in
the United States seems adamant in pursuing the signing and implementation of
TRIPS-plus agreements, which considerably erode some of the existing and earned
flexibilities allowed to developing countries in the area of generic medicines.
Another strategy is to continue using punitive trade policies to make developing
countries comply with the interests of the pharmaceutical companies. The threat
of Special 301 list is a powerful bargaining tool for changing the behaviour of
developing countries. It would seem evident that the lure of a share in big
markets, and the problems posed by the export of generic medicines will enhance
the possibility of having more legal battles between the multinational drug
companies and developing countries like India. The United States in particular
seems very interested in continuing to push for more restrictive international
patent system. It is their claim that pricing does not affect access and that by
providing better patent protection the developing countries will benefit from
increased international investment and better trading conditions.[141]
But these arguments are not based in empirical data; in fact, little is
understood about the relationship between pricing, investment and research. As
stated by Abbott:
Regardless of whether enhanced patent protection for
pharmaceutical products may at some point in the future provide benefits to
developing countries, there is no sound empirical basis for the United States to
demand immediate introduction of such protection by developing countries, or to
stand in the way of extending transition timetables for least-developed
countries.[142]
Regardless of
these considerations, there is still a vested interest in continuing to ensure
patent protection in developed countries. There cannot be any doubt that despite
all of the problems that have been mentioned already about the amount of
research investment by the pharmaceutical companies, they are still spending a
considerable amount of money in that field. It would be dishonest to ask the
members of an industry to relinquish all of their intellectual property rights
in order to provide access to medicines worldwide, but a balance must be struck
between excessively restrictive monopolies and exceptional issues of public
health.
The solutions
to this problem then will not be simple. It is useless to propose the abolition
of all pharmaceutical patents, or the immediate destruction of the TRIPS
agreement. The solutions lies in the coming together of several areas, such as
international trade, intellectual property rights, international assistance,
government policy, and private assistance.
The
pharmaceutical industry must understand first that it is in their best interest
to provide some free or low-cost medicines to the poorest areas of the world.
Many private initiatives are already underway to provide low-cost medicines to
developing nations, such as PhRMA’s Global Partnerships programmes, which give
approximately $580 million USD each year in assistance and medicines to
developing countries.[143]
These initiatives are on the increase, prompted by growing public pressure and
investors clamouring for more ethical corporate policies.[144]
Developed nations are also providing direct assistance to developing countries,
with the United States donating $2 billion USD globally in 2003 to the
pharmaceutical industry.[145]
The Bush administration has taken a significant interest to HIV in Africa,
donating $200 million USD in 2001, and $500 million USD in 2003 and 2003 to this
problem alone.[146]
This investment has prompted the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria,[147]
which consists of official government donations from developed nations, such as
the funds from the United States, and considerable contributions from France and
the UK. Another worthwhile effort is a joint project from the Clinton
Foundation, the World Bank, UNICEF and the Global Fund to provide generic HIV
medicines to developing nations.[148]
The Clinton Foundation has also achieved some price reduction agreements of
anti-retroviral drugs with some major pharmaceutical companies.[149]
Donations and
direct assistance are needed, but there should also be a strong recognition that
any solution must involve trade. There are already concerns about the problem of
the misdirection of medicines sent to developing countries, and then sent back
to developed nations to profit from the immense price discrepancy. It is easy to
see how generics exported to a poor country could make their way to a rich one.
It is also easy to see how donated medicines could be misdirected for profit. To
avoid some of the corrupt misdirection, the European Commission has adopted a
set of regulations that attempt to stop the misdirection of drugs produced
within the European Union from LDCs.[150]
This regulation establishes a “tiered priced product”, which are medicines
manufactured in the EU that are sold in developing countries at a 25% of what
they cost in OECD countries, and with only a 15% profit margin.[151]
These medicines must also have a mark (see Figure 1). There is already a plan to
implement similar provisions into the WTO’s health system.[152]
These provisions could create a better environment in which pharmaceutical
companies and developed governments will be more willing to donate and export
essential drugs to the neediest parts of the world.
However, the
long term goal must be the need to get developing countries to be able to
produce, manufacture and research their own pharmaceuticals. Donations and
assistance only serve to alleviate the problem, but as the cases studied above
demonstrate that real improvements in health figures can only be achieved
through the creation of a local pharmaceutical industry. This means that the
problem of pharmaceuticals is a problem of technology transfer; the issue will
be once more the innovation and imitation dichotomy. Developing countries have
to imitate technology that already exists in developed ones, and after a while
there will be enough technological know-how to generate their own technology.
This can already be seen in developing countries that have imitated health
technology, such as the case in India.[153]
All efforts
then must go towards enhancing local production and research capabilities.
Private efforts from the pharmaceutical companies in this respect should be
welcome. Pharmaceutical companies should understand that capacity building and
technology transfer can only work in their favour as a future strategy. If
developing countries improve their health production standards, they will then
become paying customers when they can afford medicines at better prices. As far
as things stand, pharmaceutical companies are not profiting from poor countries,
and there is no apparent immediate economic damage to them in promoting the
transfer of health technology to the poorest regions of the globe. If things
continue as they are, poor countries will remain under-developed, so the future
revenue in sales from those countries will remain low. On the other hand, if
these countries were to become developed, a potential market would be opened for
these companies.
There should
also be more efforts from the governments of developing nations, such as the
case of Thailand, where the government has put considerable investment in making
sure that the local generic industry can now produce high-quality drugs to
combat the HIV epidemic. In fact, “When
the Thai Government Pharmaceutical Organization started producing the three-drug
pill in March 2002, monthly treatment for one person plummeted to $30 from
$500-$750.”[154]
However, not all governments have the capability to fund efforts similar to
those of the Thai government, not to mention the local capabilities to embark on
such an undertaking.
But these
solutions are only the start. Other solutions should be sought to encourage the
transfer of technology in the health area. These solutions should be in par to
those already described in this work, but there are other methods that can be
used to enhance local production of medicines.
Conclusion
The price of
drugs, patents and the state of international trade law in the shape of the
regulation of intellectual property rights are just a part of the bigger picture
when dealing with the problem of access to medicines.
As it was
mentioned in the last section of the article, there are some serious efforts
underway in order to provide developing countries with beneficial access to
medicines, and these efforts have to be applauded and continued. The good will
of developed nations in this respect cannot be denied.
But perhaps
the debate will be brought forward by some recent happenings. The nightly news
bulletins in developed countries are filled with stories about avian flu and the
prospect of a pandemic that will kill millions of people. But it has also
brought one issue back to the table, the access to medicines debate. There are
reports that there is only one antiviral drug that deals with the current strain
of the disease, a drug by Swiss company Roche called Tamiflu. There is growing
concern that Roche is the only company with a patent to produce this drug, and
it is finally dawning on some people that this may not be such a good idea after
all. This could highlight that while patents are generally beneficial, they can
also prove dangerous in the time of an emergency.
As things
stand, the status quo is not affecting the pharmaceutical companies. Profits are
still flowing like never before, and potential advancements in biotechnology
could translate into more sales in the developed countries. Nevertheless, there
cannot be any doubt that the pharmaceutical companies can only benefit from the
attempts by the developing countries to improve their living standards, as they
will later become paying customers when they can afford the drugs. And one of
the ways in which the less developed nations can improve those living standards
is through access to basic medicines. As far as things stand, pharmaceutical
companies are not receiving any sales revenue from poor countries, and there is
no apparent immediate economic damage to them in allowing access to generic
drugs by populations in need. If things continue as they are, poor countries
will remain under-developed, so the future revenue in sales from those countries
will remain low. On the other hand, if these countries were to become developed,
a potential market would be opened for these companies.
With this in
mind, there may be more willingness from the part of the developed world to
address this issue.
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